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EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE PREFERENCES AGAINST
MULTIPLE MUTATIONS
YU-SUNG TU AND WEI-TORNG JUANG
Abstract. We use the indirect evolutionary approach to study evolutionarily
stable preferences against multiple mutations in single- and multi-population
settings, respectively. Each individual has subjective preferences over potential
outcomes, and individuals are randomly matched to play an n-player strategic
game. But their actual fitnesses are defined by material payoff functions. In
the two population settings, respectively, we examine necessary and sufficient
conditions for evolutionary stability against multiple mutations; we character-
ize the relations between the order of stability and the level of efficiency.
1. Introduction
The indirect evolutionary approach, pioneered by Gu¨th and Yaari (1992) and
Gu¨th (1995), is the standard model for studying the evolution of preferences. This
approach has emerged to understand how behavior appears inconsistent with mate-
rial self-interest, such as altruism, vengeance, punishment, fairness, and reciprocity,
may be evolutionarily stable. 1 In this model, players are characterized by prefer-
ences rather than pre-programmed actions. Players choose strategies to maximize
their subjective preferences, but receive the real fitnesses defined by material pay-
off functions. Eventually, evolutionary selection is driven by differences in average
fitness values.
The concept of static stability in almost all literature regarding the indirect
evolutionary approach is built on symmetric two-player games played by a single
population of players without identifying their positions. 2 In addition, all these
stability concepts require robustness against a single mutation. However, the as-
sumption that there is at most one mutation arising in a population may not hold
true for all environments. Furthermore, it may be the case that multiple mutations
can destabilize a population, whereas a single mutation cannot destabilize it (see
Examples 3.5 and 4.4). This paper, by contrast, considers the possibility that there
are more than one new entrants entering a population simultaneously; we formalize
evolutionary robustness against multiple mutations in single- and multi-population
settings, respectively.
Throughout this paper, players are randomly drawn to play a strategic game
in terms of their preferences, and we allow for all general preferences to compete
in each population. As in a lot of the indirect evolutionary approach literature,
the stability criterion we use is consistent with the concept of a neutrally stable
strategy, which means that mutants may coexist with the incumbents in a stable
Key words and phrases. Evolution of preferences, multiple mutations, evolutionary stability,
efficiency.
1See, for example, Gu¨th and Yaari (1992), Gu¨th (1995), Bester and Gu¨th (1998),
Huck and Oechssler (1999), and Ostrom (2000).
2Exceptions can be found: von Widekind (2008, p. 61) gives a definition of stability for two
separate populations and develops an outlook with some illustrative examples; Tu and Juang
(2018) study the evolution of general preferences in multiple populations under various degrees of
observability.
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environment, but they do not spread. 3 A natural question under this criterion is:
what if there are more new mutations appearing in the post-entry environment?
Can the original incumbents avoid being eliminated again? 4 Several mutations
appearing simultaneously in a population can be considered not only as a small
probability event, but also as a simple way of responding to this issue.
The key feature of the indirect evolutionary approach is that players can adjust
their strategies according to their opponents if preferences are observable. It follows
that an inefficient outcome can be destabilized by new entrants with appropriate
preferences. Thus, every stable outcome is naturally endowed with some extra
efficiency. 5 This also indicates that an individual having materialist preferences
may have no evolutionary advantage.
In this paper, we introduce multiple mutations to characterize the relations be-
tween the order of stability and the level of efficiency in single- and multi-population
settings, respectively. A common feature is that if the number of mutations is some-
how increased enough, then the forms of efficiency will evolve toward the Pareto
frontier of the cooperative payoff region. The reason for this phenomenon is that
the increase in the number of mutant types will increase the number of types of
correlated deviations, and it may bring more benefits to mutants. Of course, The
concept of multi-mutation stability can be used to refine the evolutionarily stable
outcomes.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we introduce basic notation and notions
that will be used throughout the paper. In Section 3, we study evolutionarily
stable preferences against multiple mutations in a single-population setting; we
examine necessary and sufficient conditions for various orders of stability. Besides,
in Section 4, we examine the above issues in a multi-population setting.
2. Basic Notation and Notions
The set of players {1, . . . , n} is denoted by N , and for each i ∈ N we let Ai be a
finite set of actions available to player i. For any finite set S, let ∆(S) denote the
set of probability distributions over S. An element σ ∈
∏
i∈N ∆(Ai) is known as a
mixed strategy profile; a correlated strategy for n matched players is any element ϕ
in ∆(
∏
i∈N Ai). Every mixed strategy profile σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) can be interpreted
as a correlated strategy ϕσ in the following way: ϕσ(a1, . . . , an) =
∏
i∈N σi(ai)
for all (a1, . . . , an) ∈
∏
i∈N Ai. We will call this correlated strategy the induced
correlated strategy of σ. For each i ∈ N , let pii :
∏
i∈N Ai → R be the material
payoff function of player i. The function pii can be extended to the set
∏
i∈N ∆(Ai)
as a multilinear function; it can also be extended to the set ∆(
∏
i∈N Ai) by taking
expected values. Obviously, we have pii(σ) = pii(ϕσ) for all σ ∈
∏
i∈N ∆(Ai), where
ϕσ is the induced correlated strategy of σ.
We interpret the value pii(a) as the reproductive fitness that player i obtains if
an action profile a ∈
∏
i∈N Ai is played. The evolutionary success or failure of a
preference type is determined by its average fitness. Combining all the n material
payoff functions, we get the vector-valued material payoff function pi :
∏
i∈N Ai →
Rn that assigns to each action profile a the n-tuple (pi1(a), . . . , pin(a)). This vector-
valued function pi can be extended to the set
∏
i∈N ∆(Ai), or to the set ∆(
∏
i∈N Ai),
through pi1, . . . , pin.
3The concept of a neutrally stable strategy was introduced by Maynard Smith (1982).
4Regarding standard evolutionary game theoretic models, van Veelen (2012) studies the ques-
tion of how a neutral mutant affects a neutrally stable strategy.
5When preferences are observable, the tendency towards efficiency is a general property of
models based on the indirect evolutionary approach; see also Dekel et al. (2007), von Widekind
(2008), and Tu and Juang (2018).
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Let Θ be the set of all von Neumann–Morgenstern utility functions over
∏
i∈N Ai.
For i ∈ N , a utility function θi ∈ Θ, referred to as a preference type, is identified
with a group of individuals in the i-th population who have such preferences and
make the same decisions. A preference type is said to be indifferent if it is repre-
sented in terms of a constant utility function The preferences of individuals may
not be represented by their respective material payoff functions; individuals in
the same population may differ in their preference rankings of the potential out-
comes. Specifically, if two players have the same preference relation but choose
distinct strategies, their preferences can be represented here by two different utility
functions congruent modulo a positive affine transformation. We assume that the
number of preference types present in each population is finite, and the number
of individuals corresponding to each present type is infinite. Then a probability
distribution on Θ, representing the distribution of preferences in one population,
must have finite support.
Suppose that preferences are fully observable, and that individuals are drawn
independently to play an n-player strategic game in terms of their preferences,
which describes the strategic interactions among the matched individuals. Then
fitness values are assigned to strategies according to the material payoff function.
We can imagine that such a game is repeated infinitely many times, and one of
the Nash equilibria is played in each of the resulting games. So the average fitness
to each individual can be determined, and the principle of survival of the fittest
suggests that a preference type can prevail only if the type receives the highest
average fitness in its population.
The objective of this paper is to study the evolution of preferences without
any restriction on the number of mutations in each population. We will formalize
robustness against multiple mutations in two cases: one is the case where there is
only one population and all n players are randomly drawn from the population;
the other is the case where there are n separate populations and one player is
randomly drawn from each of the n populations. To investigate the effects of
multiple mutations on populations, the concepts of multi-mutation stability in our
single- and multi-population settings are consistent with those used in Dekel et al.
(2007) and Tu and Juang (2018), respectively.
Our criteria should satisfy two requirements: if the population shares of mutants
are small enough, the behavioral outcomes are almost unchanged, and no incumbent
will be driven out. For a mutation set, we consider that it fails to invade if one of the
mutant types in some population will become extinct, as suggested by Tu and Juang
(2018). The reason for this is that interactions among mutants of a mutation set
may look as if they cooperate with one another such that some of the mutants
have fitness advantages over the incumbents at the expense of the other mutants.
Such fitness advantages will disappear when the latter go extinct. Rather than
examining the emergence of one particular preference type, we are interested in
the evolutionarily viable outcome. We will give necessary and sufficient conditions
for the existence of stable outcomes in the single- and multi-population settings,
respectively.
3. The Single-population Case
In this section, let individuals in each match be drawn randomly from a sin-
gle infinite population. Suppose that players cannot identify their positions in the
resulting game they play, and that the fitness values assigned to the adopted equi-
librium depend only on the strategies being played, not on who play them. The
material payoff function and players’ preferences are presented below.
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For ease of presentation, only two-player games will be considered in the single-
population case. Under the above assumptions, the game ({1, 2}, (Ai), (pii)) that
is used for the fitness assignment is a symmetric game, that is, A1 = A2 and
pi2(a, a
′) = pi1(a
′, a) for any strategies a and a′. We will write S for the common
set of pure strategies available to players in any position. For a preference type
θ ∈ Θ, the expected subjective utility to its strategy σ, when played against some
strategy σ′, is denoted by θ(σ, σ′), where σ, σ′ ∈ ∆(S). Let M(Θ) be the set of all
probability distributions on Θ having finite supports.
Assume that individuals for each match are drawn independently according to
µ ∈M(Θ), which represents the distribution of preference types in the population.
Interactions between any two players in supp(µ), the support of µ, are charac-
terized by the two-player game Γ(µ). Combining this with the symmetric game
({1, 2}, S, (pii)), the pair [({1, 2}, S, (pii)),Γ(µ)] is referred to as an environment. A
strategy for a preference type θ ∈ supp(µ) is a function bθ : supp(µ)→ ∆(S); play-
ers of the type θ would choose the strategy bθ(θ
′) when playing against the type
θ′. Define b : supp(µ)2 → ∆(S)2 by b(θ, θ′) =
(
bθ(θ
′), bθ′(θ)
)
. 6 We say b is an
equilibrium in the game Γ(µ) if for any θ, θ′ ∈ supp(µ),
bθ(θ
′) ∈ argmax
σ∈∆(S)
θ
(
σ, bθ′(θ)
)
.
Let B(supp(µ)) denote the set of all such equilibria in Γ(µ). 7
For a preference distribution µ ∈M(Θ) and an equilibrium b ∈ B(supp(µ)), the
pair (µ, b) is called a configuration. By the law of large numbers, the average fitness
of a preference type θ ∈ supp(µ) with respect to (µ, b) is given by
Πθ(µ; b) =
∑
θ′∈supp(µ)
µ(θ′)pi1
(
b(θ, θ′)
)
.
We define the aggregate outcome of (µ, b) to be the correlated strategy ϕµ,b satis-
fying
ϕµ,b(a, a
′) =
∑
(θ,θ′)∈supp(µ)2
µ(θ)µ(θ′)[bθ(θ
′)(a)][bθ′(θ)(a
′)]
for all (a, a′) ∈ S2. Then the equality ϕµ,b(a, a
′) = ϕµ,b(a
′, a) holds for any a,
a′ ∈ S, which means that the aggregate outcome is a symmetric correlated strategy,
so pi1(ϕµ,b) = pi2(ϕµ,b). In particular, a symmetric strategy profile (σ, σ) ∈ ∆(S)
2
is called an aggregate outcome if the induced correlated strategy ϕσ is the aggregate
outcome of some configuration, where ϕσ is defined by ϕσ(a, a
′) = σ(a)σ(a′) for all
(a, a′) ∈ S2.
Let µ ∈ M(Θ) be the incumbent preference distribution. Suppose that there are
distinct mutations θ˜1, . . . , θ˜r introduced into the population simultaneously with
population shares ε1, . . . , εr, respectively. In this paper, we allow for all possible
types of mutants to compete, except that they must be distinguishable from the
incumbents, that is, θ˜s /∈ supp(µ) for all s. The set {θ˜1, . . . , θ˜r}, called an r-th
order mutation set, is denoted by Θ˜(r), and the multiset {ε1, . . . , εr} is denoted by
E(r). We will use the notation ‖E(r)‖1 for the sum ε
1 + · · · + εr. The post-entry
distribution of preferences can be characterized by
µ˜E(r) = (1− ‖E(r)‖1)µ+ ε
1δ
θ˜1
+ · · ·+ εrδ
θ˜r
6In a symmetric game ({1, 2}, S, (pii)), the notation ∆(S)
2 means ∆(S)×∆(S), and the notation
∆(S2) will be used for ∆(S × S).
7The set B(supp(µ)) is nonempty, because not only does a mixed Nash equilibrium always
exist, but we can also find a symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium in any finite symmetric game.
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where δ
θ˜s
is the degenerate distribution concentrated at θ˜s for s = 1, . . . , r, and its
support, supp(µ˜E(r)), is supp(µ)∪ Θ˜(r). For notational convenience, we shall often
abbreviate Θ˜(r), E(r), and µ˜E(r) to Θ˜, E , and µ˜E , respectively.
Since preference evolution is driven by differences in fitness values, it is necessary
to assume that incumbents receive the same average fitness for a configuration to
be stable.
Definition 3.1. A configuration (µ, b) is said to be balanced if Πθ(µ; b) = Πθ′(µ; b)
for every θ, θ′ ∈ supp(µ).
To satisfy the condition that mutants cannot significantly affect the aggregate
outcome if they are rare enough, we demand that the strategic interactions between
incumbents will remain unchanged when they are matched again in the post-entry
environment.
Definition 3.2. Let (µ, b) be a configuration in [({1, 2}, S, (pii)),Γ(µ)], and let a
mutation set Θ˜(r) be given with E(r). In Γ(µ˜E), a post-entry equilibrium b˜ ∈
B(supp(µ˜E )) is focal relative to b if b˜θ(θ
′) = bθ(θ
′) for any θ, θ′ ∈ supp(µ). Let
B(supp(µ˜E ); b) be the set of all focal equilibria relative to b in Γ(µ˜E), called a focal
set.
Remark. Note that the focal set B(supp(µ˜E ); b) is nonempty, and that it is indepen-
dent of E(r). In addition, the desired property that ϕ
µ˜E ,˜b
→ ϕµ,b as ‖E(r)‖1 → 0
is obviously held for any b˜ ∈ B(supp(µ˜E); b).
The criterion for multi-mutation stability of a configuration defined in the single-
population case is formulated as follows.
Definition 3.3. In [({1, 2}, S, (pii)),Γ(µ)], a configuration (µ, b) is said to be multi-
mutation stable of order r, or r-th order stable, if it is balanced, and if for any
Θ˜(r) ⊂ Θ \ supp(µ) and any b˜ ∈ B(supp(µ˜E); b), there exists some ε¯ ∈ (0, 1) such
that for every E(r) with ‖E(r)‖1 ∈ (0, ε¯), either (i) or (ii) is satisfied.
(i) Πθ(µ˜
E ; b˜) > Π
θ˜s
(µ˜E ; b˜) for some θ˜s ∈ Θ˜(r) and for every θ ∈ supp(µ).
(ii) Πθ(µ˜
E ; b˜) = Π
θ̂
(µ˜E ; b˜) for every θ, θ̂ ∈ supp(µ˜E ).
If (µ, b) is stable of order 1, it is usually simply said to be stable. If (µ, b) is stable
of all orders, it is said to be infinitely stable. We call a symmetric strategy profile
(σ, σ) ∈ ∆(S)2 multi-mutation stable of order r, or r-th order stable, if it is the
aggregate outcome of an r-th order stable configuration.
Remark. There is a noteworthy difference between the stability concepts defined
here and in Dekel et al. (2007). The statement of the stability condition used in
Dekel et al. (2007) contains the possibility that there are both a mutant type and
an incumbent type who have the lowest average fitness, but at the same time there
is another incumbent type who has a higher average fitness. 8 In this paper, our
definition directly excludes this possibility.
It is easy to see that a configuration must be kept multi-mutation stable of lower
orders if it is a stable configuration of order greater than 1.
Lemma 3.4. Let (µ, b) be an l-th order stable configuration with l > 1. Then it is
stable of order r for any r < l.
Proof. Suppose that a balanced configuration (µ, b) is not stable of order r. This
means that there exist a mutation set Θ˜(r) and an equilibrium b˜ ∈ B(supp(µ˜E ); b)
8Once it happens, the dynamic process would seem to eventually lead to the extinction of both
the mutant type and the incumbent type who have the lowest average fitness.
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such that for arbitrarily given ε¯ ∈ (0, 1), we can choose E(r) with ‖E(r)‖1 ∈ (0, ε¯)
for which the following two conditions are satisfied: (1) for every θ˜s ∈ Θ˜(r), there is
θ ∈ supp(µ) with Π
θ˜s
(µ˜E ; b˜) ≥ Πθ(µ˜
E ; b˜); (2) the inequality Πθ(µ˜
E ; b˜) 6= Π
θ̂
(µ˜E ; b˜)
holds for some θ, θ̂ ∈ supp(µ˜E).
Let l be a positive integer with l > r. To prove that the configuration (µ, b) is
not l-th order stable, we consider a new mutation set Θ˜′(l) = Θ˜(r) ∪ {θ˜r+1, . . . , θ˜l}
with E ′(l) satisfying ε′s = εs for s = 1, . . . , r − 1 and ε′r + ε′r+1 + · · · + ε′l = εr.
Suppose that the preferences of each of the mutant types θ˜r+1, . . . , θ˜l are such
that their strategic behavior is the same as that of the mutant type θ˜r. Then
there is an equilibrium b˜′ ∈ B(supp(µ˜E
′
); b) such that for the given ε¯ ∈ (0, 1),
we can choose E ′(l) for which Π
θ̂
(µ˜E
′
; b˜′) = Π
θ̂
(µ˜E ; b˜) for all θ̂ ∈ supp(µ˜E), and
Π
θ˜s
(µ˜E
′
; b˜′) = Π
θ˜r
(µ˜E ; b˜) for s = r + 1, . . . , l. (Here µ˜E
′
denotes the post-entry
distribution of preferences after θ˜r+1, . . . , θ˜l also entering the population.) This
clearly leads to the result that (µ, b) is not stable of order l for l > r. 
The next example shows that a stable configuration is not stable of higher order;
the converse of Lemma 3.4 is not true.
Example 3.5. Suppose that the following symmetric game characterizes the fitness
assignment. The set of actions available to each player is {a1, a2}, and the material
payoff function is denoted by pi.
a1 a2
a1 0, 0 2, 2
a2 2, 2 0, 0
Let (µ, b) be a monomorphic configuration constituted as follows: for θ ∈ supp(µ),
θ(ai, aj) = 1 if ai = aj and θ(ai, aj) = 0 otherwise, and bθ(θ) = (0.5, 0.5). We first
show that the configuration (µ, b) is stable. Let θ˜ be an entrant with a population
share ε, and let b˜ be a focal equilibrium relative to b. Then the average fitnesses of
θ and θ˜ are, respectively,
Πθ(µ˜
E ; b˜) = (1− ε)pi1
(
(0.5, 0.5), (0.5, 0.5)
)
+ εpi1
(
b˜(θ, θ˜)
)
and
Π
θ˜
(µ˜E ; b˜) = (1− ε)pi1
(˜
b(θ˜, θ)
)
+ εpi1
(
b˜(θ˜, θ˜)
)
.
If b˜
θ˜
(θ) 6= (0.5, 0.5), we have pi1
(
b˜(θ˜, θ)
)
< 1, and therefore Πθ(µ˜
E ; b˜) > Π
θ˜
(µ˜E ; b˜)
whenever ε is sufficiently small. If b˜
θ˜
(θ) = (0.5, 0.5), it is easy to check that
Πθ(µ˜
E ; b˜)−Π
θ˜
(µ˜E ; b˜) = ε
[
1− pi1
(
b˜(θ˜, θ˜)
)]
≥ 0
for any focal equilibrium b˜ and any ε ∈ (0, 1). Thus (µ, b) is stable, and so is the
strategy profile ((0.5, 0.5), (0.5, 0.5)). However, as we see below, the configuration
(µ, b) is not stable of order 2.
Let θ˜1 and θ˜2 be two distinct mutant types introduced into the population
with population shares ε1 and ε2, respectively. Suppose that the adopted equi-
librium b˜ ∈ B(supp(µ˜E); b) satisfies b˜(θ˜1, θ˜2) = (a1, a2) and b˜(θ˜
i, θ) = b˜(θ˜i, θ˜i) =
((0.5, 0.5), (0.5, 0.5)) for i = 1, 2. Then we obtain Πθ(µ˜
E ; b˜) = 1 and Π
θ˜i
(µ˜E ; b˜) =
1 + εj for all i, where j 6= i. This shows that (µ, b) is not a second order stable
configuration. Furthermore, Theorem 3.16 will guarantee that ((0.5, 0.5), (0.5, 0.5))
is the unique stable strategy profile, and that there exists no strategy profile which
is stable of order greater than 1 in this game.
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Remark. Because mutants entering the population can have any preference type,
technically indifferent types are used instead of potential entrants that are well
adapted to the environments.
In symmetric games, a specific type of efficiency focusing on symmetric strategy
profiles is frequently used.
Definition 3.6. In a symmetric game ({1, 2}, S, (pii)), a strategy σ
∗ ∈ ∆(S) (or a
strategy profile (σ∗, σ∗)) is efficient if pi1(σ
∗, σ∗) ≥ pi1(σ, σ) for all σ ∈ ∆(S).
Obviously, the efficient fitness pi1(σ
∗, σ∗) is uniquely determined, but an efficient
strategy may not be unique. Except for efficiency of a symmetric strategy profile,
here the concept of Pareto efficiency is needed to characterize the features of multi-
mutation stability.
Definition 3.7. For a nonempty subset C of Rn, the Pareto frontier of C is defined
as
P (C) = { v ∈ C | there is no w ∈ C with w 6= v and wi ≥ vi for i = 1, . . . , n }.
We will focus attention on the Pareto frontiers of the noncooperative payoff region
and the cooperative payoff region induced by the material payoff function. 9
Remark. In a symmetric two-player game, a strategy σ¯ ∈ ∆(S) satisfying pi(σ¯, σ¯) ∈
P (pi(∆(S)2)) must be efficient, but not vice versa as Example 3.5 shows.
Before we derive the necessary conditions for configurations to be multi-mutation
stable, we first introduce two useful lemmas.
Lemma 3.8. Suppose that (µ, b) is a stable configuration in [({1, 2}, S, (pii)),Γ(µ)].
Then for any θ′, θ′′ ∈ supp(µ), the equality
pi1
(
b(θ′, θ)
)
= pi1
(
b(θ′′, θ)
)
holds for every θ ∈ supp(µ).
Proof. Suppose that there exist distinct types θ′, θ′′ ∈ supp(µ) such that
pi1
(
b(θ′, θ¯)
)
> pi1
(
b(θ′′, θ¯)
)
for some θ¯ ∈ supp(µ). Introduce a mutant type θ˜ into the population with a popula-
tion share ε. Suppose that the post-entry equilibrium b˜ chosen from B(supp(µ˜E ); b)
satisfies b˜(θ˜, θ¯) = b(θ′, θ¯) and b˜(θ˜, θ) = b(θ′′, θ) for all θ ∈ supp(µ) \ {θ¯}. Then the
difference between Π
θ˜
(µ˜E ; b˜) and Πθ′′(µ˜
E ; b˜) is
(1− ε)µ(θ¯)
[
pi1
(
b(θ′, θ¯)
)
− pi1
(
b(θ′′, θ¯)
)]
+ ε
[
pi1
(
b˜(θ˜, θ˜)
)
− pi1
(˜
b(θ′′, θ˜)
)]
.
Thus the inequality Π
θ˜
(µ˜E ; b˜) > Πθ′′(µ˜
E ; b˜) eventually holds whenever ε is suffi-
ciently small, and so (µ, b) is not a stable configuration. 
Lemma 3.9. If (µ, b) is a stable configuration in [({1, 2}, S, (pii)),Γ(µ)], then b(θ, θ)
is efficient for every θ ∈ supp(µ).
Proof. Suppose that there exists θ¯ ∈ supp(µ) such that b(θ¯, θ¯) is not efficient.
Consider an entrant θ˜ with a population share ε. Let σ∗ ∈ ∆(S) be efficient, and
suppose that the chosen equilibrium b˜ ∈ B(supp(µ˜E); b) satisfies b˜
θ˜
(θ˜) = σ∗ and
b˜(θ˜, θ) = b(θ¯, θ) for all θ ∈ supp(µ). Then the difference
Π
θ˜
(µ˜E ; b˜)−Πθ¯(µ˜
E ; b˜) = ε
[
pi1(σ
∗, σ∗)− pi1
(
b(θ¯, θ¯)
)]
> 0
for any ε ∈ (0, 1), and thus the configuration (µ, b) is not stable. 
9For a two-player game ({1, 2}, S, (pii)), the noncooperative payoff region and the cooperative
payoff region refer to the plane regions pi(∆(S)2) and pi(∆(S2)), respectively.
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Dekel et al. (2007) show that a stable outcome must be efficient when preferences
are observable. In this paper, we demonstrate that there is a tendency for efficiency
levels to increase with higher orders of stability. If the efficiency level of an outcome
is not high enough, there are different types of mutants that can destabilize the
configuration together based on their own preferences as follows. Mutants of any
type would maintain some pre-entry outcomes when matched against themselves or
against the incumbents, and would achieve more efficient outcomes when matched
against the other mutant types.
Theorem 3.10. Let (µ, b) be a configuration in [({1, 2}, S, (pii)),Γ(µ)]. Suppose
that σ∗ ∈ ∆(S) is efficient in ({1, 2}, S, (pii)) and that θ, θ
′ ∈ supp(µ).
(i) If (µ, b) is stable, then pi
(
b(θ, θ′)
)
= pi(σ∗, σ∗).
(ii) If (µ, b) is stable of order 2, then pi
(
b(θ, θ′)
)
∈ P (pi(∆(S)2)).
(iii) If (µ, b) is stable of order 3, then pi
(
b(θ, θ′)
)
∈ P (pi(∆(S2))).
Proof. Let (µ, b) be stable in [({1, 2}, S, (pii)),Γ(µ)]. Then by Lemma 3.8, we have
pi1
(
b(θ, θ′)
)
= pi1
(
b(θ′, θ′)
)
and pi2
(
b(θ, θ′)
)
= pi2
(
b(θ, θ)
)
for any θ, θ′ ∈ supp(µ). By
Lemma 3.9, both b(θ, θ) and b(θ′, θ′) are efficient. Therefore, pi
(
b(θ, θ′)
)
= pi(σ∗, σ∗)
for any θ, θ′ ∈ supp(µ).
For (ii), assume that there are θ¯1, θ¯2 ∈ supp(µ) with pi
(
b(θ¯1, θ¯2)
)
/∈ P (pi(∆(S)2)).
Then there is a strategy profile (σ, σ′) ∈ ∆(S)2 satisfying pii(σ, σ
′) ≥ pii
(
b(θ¯1, θ¯2)
)
for every i ∈ {1, 2} and pik(σ, σ
′) > pik
(
b(θ¯1, θ¯2)
)
for some k ∈ {1, 2}. Let Θ˜ =
{θ˜1, θ˜2} with E = {ε1, ε2} be introduced. Suppose that the adopted equilibrium
b˜ ∈ B(supp(µ˜E ); b) satisfies b˜(θ˜1, θ˜2) = (σ, σ′), and the relations b˜(θ˜i, θ˜i) = b(θ¯i, θ¯i)
and b˜(θ˜i, θ) = b(θ¯i, θ) hold for i = 1, 2 and for all θ ∈ supp(µ). For each i ∈ {1, 2},
the difference between the average fitnesses of θ˜i and θ¯i can be written as
Π
θ˜i
(µ˜E ; b˜)−Πθ¯i(µ˜
E ; b˜) = εj
[
pii(σ, σ
′)− pii
(
b(θ¯1, θ¯2)
)]
≥ 0
where j ∈ {1, 2} \ {i}, and hence Π
θ˜k
(µ˜E ; b˜) > Πθ¯k(µ˜
E ; b˜) for some k ∈ {1, 2}, no
matter what E is. Therefore, (µ, b) is not a second order stable configuration.
For (iii), we argue by contradiction. Let the configuration (µ, b) be stable of
order 3 in [({1, 2}, S, (pii)),Γ(µ)], and suppose that there exist θ¯
1, θ¯2 ∈ supp(µ)
such that pi
(
b(θ¯1, θ¯2)
)
/∈ P (pi(∆(S2))). By Lemma 3.4 and property (i), the equal-
ity pi
(
b(θ¯1, θ¯2)
)
= pi(σ∗, σ∗) is true, and thus pi(σ∗, σ∗) /∈ P (pi(∆(S2))). Because
({1, 2}, S, (pii)) is a symmetric two-player game, there exist a, a
′ ∈ S such that
pi1(a, a
′) + pi1(a
′, a) > 2pi1(σ
∗, σ∗).
Introduce Θ˜ = {θ˜1, θ˜2, θ˜3} into the population with E = {ε1, ε2, ε3}. Suppose that
the equilibrium b˜ ∈ B(supp(µ˜E ); b) satisfies the following conditions. When two
distinct types of mutants are matched,
b˜(θ˜1, θ˜2) = b˜(θ˜2, θ˜3) = b˜(θ˜3, θ˜1) = (a, a′).
Otherwise, for a given θ˜s ∈ Θ˜ and for any θ ∈ supp(µ), we have b˜(θ˜s, θ) = b(θ′, θ)
and b˜(θ˜s, θ˜s) = b(θ′, θ′) for some θ′ ∈ supp(µ). Let εs = ε for s = 1, 2, 3. Then the
difference between the average fitnesses of θ˜s ∈ Θ˜ and θ ∈ supp(µ) is
Π
θ˜s
(µ˜E ; b˜)−Πθ(µ˜
E ; b˜) = ε[pi1(a, a
′) + pi1(a
′, a)− 2pi1(σ
∗, σ∗)] > 0
for any ε ∈ (0, 1), and thus we have arrived at a contradiction. 
Remark. Furthermore, Lemma 3.4 implies that if (µ, b) is stable of order 2 then
pi
(
b(θ, θ′)
)
= pi(σ∗, σ∗) ∈ P (pi(∆(S)2)), and that if (µ, b) is stable of order 3 then
pi
(
b(θ, θ′)
)
= pi(σ∗, σ∗) ∈ P (pi(∆(S)2)) ∩ P (pi(∆(S2))).
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When a configuration is stable, it is clear that the average fitness of every incum-
bent must be efficient, since all incumbents receive the efficient fitness in each of
their interactions, as described in part (i) of Theorem 3.10. Besides, the aggregate
outcome of a stable configuration also corresponds to the efficient fitness value.
Corollary 3.11. Let (µ, b) be a stable configuration in [({1, 2}, S, (pii)),Γ(µ)] with
the aggregate outcome ϕµ,b, and let σ
∗ be an efficient strategy in ({1, 2}, S, (pii)).
Then the relations
pi1(ϕµ,b) = pi1(σ
∗, σ∗) = Πθ(µ; b)
hold for every θ ∈ supp(µ).
Proof. Let (µ, b) be a stable configuration. Then we have
pi1(ϕµ,b) =
∑
(a,a′)∈S2
ϕµ,b(a, a
′)pi1(a, a
′)
=
∑
(θ,θ′)∈supp(µ)2
µ(θ)µ(θ′)
∑
(a,a′)∈S2
[bθ(θ
′)(a)][bθ′(θ)(a
′)]pi1(a, a
′)
=
∑
(θ,θ′)∈supp(µ)2
µ(θ)µ(θ′)pi1
(
b(θ, θ′)
)
= pi1(σ
∗, σ∗)
by part (i) of Theorem 3.10. 
In Example 3.5, the stable configuration can be invaded and displaced by a
mutation set of two types of mutants. In fact, mutants’ invasion capacity cannot
unrestrictedly expand with the new types entering the population. We show here
that a third order stable configuration in a two-player environment will also be
stable of all orders.
Theorem 3.12. In [({1, 2}, S, (pii)),Γ(µ)], a configuration (µ, b) is infinitely stable
if and only if it is stable of order 3.
Proof. One direction follows immediately from Lemma 3.4: an infinitely stable
configuration must be stable of order 3. For the converse, suppose that (µ, b) is
a third order stable configuration in [({1, 2}, S, (pii)),Γ(µ)]. Then, by the remark
after Theorem 3.10, we have pi
(
b(θ, θ′)
)
= pi(σ∗, σ∗) ∈ P (pi(∆(S2))) for all θ, θ′ ∈
supp(µ), where σ∗ ∈ ∆(S) is an efficient strategy. Let r ∈ Z+, and let Θ˜ =
{θ˜1, . . . , θ˜r} be introduced into the population with E = {ε1, . . . , εr}. For any
given θ ∈ supp(µ), θ˜s ∈ Θ˜, and for arbitrarily chosen b˜ ∈ B(supp(µ˜E); b), the
difference between their average fitnesses Πθ(µ˜
E ; b˜) and Π
θ˜s
(µ˜E ; b˜) is∑
θ′∈supp(µ)
µ˜E(θ′)
[
pi1(σ
∗, σ∗)−pi1
(
b˜(θ˜s, θ′)
)]
+
∑
θ˜′∈Θ˜
µ˜E(θ˜′)
[
pi1
(
b˜(θ, θ˜′)
)
−pi1
(˜
b(θ˜s, θ˜′)
)]
.
We see first that pi1(σ
∗, σ∗) ≥ pi1
(˜
b(θ˜s, θ′)
)
for all θ′ ∈ supp(µ), since otherwise,
as in the proof of Lemma 3.8, the post-entry average fitness of each incumbent will
be strictly less than the average fitness of some sufficiently rare mutant type that
invades the population alone with suitable strategies, a contradiction. Moreover,
if there exists θ¯ ∈ supp(µ) such that pi1(σ
∗, σ∗) > pi1
(˜
b(θ˜s, θ¯)
)
, then Πθ(µ˜
E ; b˜) >
Π
θ˜s
(µ˜E ; b˜) for all θ ∈ supp(µ) whenever ‖E‖1 is small enough, which means that
the mutation set Θ˜ would fail to invade. We therefore assume from now on that
pi1
(
b˜(θ˜s, θ′)
)
= pi1(σ
∗, σ∗) for all θ′ ∈ supp(µ). Note that pi(σ∗, σ∗) ∈ P (pi(∆(S2))),
so that pi2(σ
∗, σ∗) ≥ pi2
(
b˜(θ˜s, θ′)
)
for all θ′ ∈ supp(µ).
If pi2(σ
∗, σ∗) > pi2
(
b˜(θ˜s, θ¯)
)
for some θ¯ ∈ supp(µ), then the assumption that
pi1
(
b˜(θ˜s, θ′)
)
= pi1(σ
∗, σ∗) for all θ′ ∈ supp(µ) implies that there is a mutant type
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that can invade the population alone to earn a strictly higher average fitness than
the incumbent type θ¯, a contradiction. Therefore, for any given θ˜s ∈ Θ˜, we let
pi2
(
b˜(θ˜s, θ)
)
= pi2(σ
∗, σ∗) for every θ ∈ supp(µ). Then the difference between the
average fitnesses of any θ ∈ supp(µ) and any θ˜s ∈ Θ˜ can be written as
Πθ(µ˜
E ; b˜)−Π
θ˜s
(µ˜E ; b˜) =
r∑
t=1
εt
[
pi1(σ
∗, σ∗)− pi1
(˜
b(θ˜s, θ˜t)
)]
.
Finally, we observe that
r∑
s=1
εs
r∑
t=1
εtpi1
(
b˜(θ˜s, θ˜t)
)
=
r∑
i=1
εiεipi1
(˜
b(θ˜i, θ˜i)
)
+
r−1∑
s=1
r∑
t=s+1
εsεt
[
pi1
(
b˜(θ˜s, θ˜t)
)
+ pi1
(
b˜(θ˜t, θ˜s)
)]
≤
r∑
s=1
εs
r∑
t=1
εtpi1(σ
∗, σ∗),
since pi(σ∗, σ∗) ∈ P (pi(∆(S2))). From this inequality, it follows that
r∑
t=1
εtpi1(σ
∗, σ∗) >
r∑
t=1
εtpi1
(
b˜(θ˜s, θ˜t)
)
for some θ˜s ∈ Θ˜, or
r∑
t=1
εtpi1(σ
∗, σ∗) =
r∑
t=1
εtpi1
(
b˜(θ˜s, θ˜t)
)
for every θ˜s ∈ Θ˜. Thus we obtain that Πθ(µ˜
E ; b˜) > Π
θ˜s
(µ˜E ; b˜) for some θ˜s ∈ Θ˜ and
for all θ ∈ supp(µ), or Πθ(µ˜
E ; b˜) = Π
θ˜s
(µ˜E ; b˜) for all θ˜s ∈ Θ˜ and all θ ∈ supp(µ),
no matter what E is. This completes the proof. 
We now turn our attention to sufficient conditions for stability. We will show that
a symmetric strict Nash equilibrium could form a stable aggregate outcome against
multiple mutations depending on its efficiency level. To see this, let a monomorphic
population consist of incumbents for which the symmetric strict Nash equilibrium
strategy is strictly dominant, and consider any mutation set. Then a mutant type
with a small population share will be driven out if the mutants choose any other
strategy when matched against the incumbents. Furthermore, a high enough level
of efficiency would imply that no matter how complicated the mutants interact,
none of them can earn a higher average fitness without any expense to themselves.
Theorem 3.13. Let (a∗, a∗) be a strict Nash equilibrium of ({1, 2}, S, (pii)).
(i) If a∗ is an efficient strategy, then (a∗, a∗) is stable.
(ii) If pi(a∗, a∗) ∈ P (pi(∆(S)2)), then (a∗, a∗) is stable of order 2.
(iii) If pi(a∗, a∗) ∈ P (pi(∆(S2))), then (a∗, a∗) is infinitely stable.
Proof. Suppose that (a∗, a∗) is a strict Nash equilibrium of ({1, 2}, S, (pii)). Let
(µ, b) be a configuration where the population consists of θ∗ for which a∗ is the
strictly dominant strategy. Let r be a positive integer, and consider a mutation set
Θ˜ = {θ˜1, . . . , θ˜r} with E = {ε1, . . . , εr}. For any θ˜s ∈ Θ˜ and any b˜ ∈ B(supp(µ˜E ); b),
the difference Πθ∗(µ˜
E ; b˜)−Π
θ˜s
(µ˜E ; b˜) is equal to
(1− ‖E‖1)
[
pi1(a
∗, a∗)− pi1
(˜
b
θ˜s
(θ∗), a∗
)]
+
r∑
t=1
εt
[
pi1
(
a∗, b˜
θ˜t
(θ∗)
)
− pi1
(˜
b(θ˜s, θ˜t)
)]
.
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Because (a∗, a∗) is a strict Nash equilibrium, we assume that b˜
θ˜s
(θ∗) = a∗ for all
θ˜s ∈ Θ˜. Otherwise, we have Πθ∗(µ˜
E ; b˜) > Π
θ˜s
(µ˜E ; b˜) for some θ˜s ∈ Θ˜ if ‖E‖1 is
sufficiently small, and so the mutation set Θ˜ fails to invade. Then the above fitness
difference can be reduced to
Πθ∗(µ˜
E ; b˜)−Π
θ˜s
(µ˜E ; b˜) =
r∑
t=1
εt
[
pi1(a
∗, a∗)− pi1
(
b˜(θ˜s, θ˜t)
)]
.
Part (i) follows directly from the condition that (a∗, a∗) is an efficient strategy
profile. For (ii), let pi(a∗, a∗) ∈ P (pi(∆(S)2)), and suppose that there are two
distinct types of mutants in Θ˜. Then (a∗, a∗) is efficient, and it follows that for
each i ∈ {1, 2}, the difference between the average fitnesses of θ∗ and θ˜i satisfies
Πθ∗(µ˜
E ; b˜)−Π
θ˜i
(µ˜E ; b˜) ≥ εj
[
pii(a
∗, a∗)− pii
(
b˜(θ˜1, θ˜2)
)]
,
where j ∈ {1, 2} \ {i}. Since pi(a∗, a∗) ∈ P (pi(∆(S)2)), we obtain that for arbitrary
E , Πθ∗(µ˜
E ; b˜) = Π
θ˜i
(µ˜E ; b˜) for all i ∈ {1, 2}, or Πθ∗(µ˜
E ; b˜) > Π
θ˜i
(µ˜E ; b˜) for some
i ∈ {1, 2}. Thus (µ, b) is a second order stable configuration.
For part (iii), let pi(a∗, a∗) ∈ P (pi(∆(S2))), and let r be any positive integer. As
in the proof of Theorem 3.12, the condition pi(a∗, a∗) ∈ P (pi(∆(S2))) implies that
r∑
t=1
εtpi1(a
∗, a∗) >
r∑
t=1
εtpi1
(
b˜(θ˜s, θ˜t)
)
for some θ˜s ∈ Θ˜, or
r∑
t=1
εtpi1(a
∗, a∗) =
r∑
t=1
εtpi1
(
b˜(θ˜s, θ˜t)
)
for all θ˜s ∈ Θ˜. Therefore Πθ∗(µ˜
E ; b˜) > Π
θ˜s
(µ˜E ; b˜) for some θ˜s ∈ Θ˜, or Πθ∗(µ˜
E ; b˜) =
Π
θ˜s
(µ˜E ; b˜) for all θ˜s ∈ Θ˜, independently of E , and the proof is finished. 
Example 3.14. Let the fitness assignment be characterized by the following sym-
metric two-player game G. The set of actions available to each player is S =
{a1, a2, a3}, and the material payoff function is denoted by pi.
a1 a2 a3
a1 3, 3 0, 0 0, 0
a2 0, 0 0, 0 9, 2
a3 0, 0 2, 9 0, 0
We see that (a1, a1) is a strict Nash equilibrium of G, and pi(a1, a1) ∈ P (pi(∆(S)
2)).
Therefore, by part (ii) of Theorem 3.13, (a1, a1) is a second order stable aggregate
outcome. However, since pi(a1, a1) /∈ P (pi(∆(S
2))), Lemma 3.4 and part (iii) of
Theorem 3.10 imply that (a∗, a∗) is not multi-mutation stable of order greater than
or equal to 3. In addition, note that if σ, σ′ ∈ ∆(S) satisfy pi(σ, σ′) = pi(a1, a1),
then (σ, σ′) = (a1, a1). So, by part (i) of Theorem 3.10, there exists no other stable
strategy profile in G.
Finally, we give a characterization of multi-mutation stable outcomes for the
class of symmetric 2 × 2 games. It turns out that in symmetric 2 × 2 games, a
symmetric strategy profile is infinitely stable if and only if it consists of a pure
12 YU-SUNG TU AND WEI-TORNG JUANG
efficient strategy. 10 Moreover, games only with a mixed efficient strategy do not
have infinitely stable aggregate outcomes.
Let the fitness assignment be represented by the following symmetric 2×2 game.
Without loss of generality, assume that A ≥ D.
a1 a2
a1 A, A B, C
a2 C, B D, D
We shall need the following lemma, and it can be shown by a direct calculation.
Lemma 3.15. When 2A ≥ B + C, the strategy a1 is efficient with fitness value
A. When 2A < B+C, the efficient strategy σ∗ is such that σ∗(a1) =
B+C−2D
2(B+C−A−D)
with fitness value
(B+C−2D)2
4(B+C−A−D) +D, which is equivalent to
(B+C−2A)2
4(B+C−A−D) +A.
Theorem 3.16. Under the symmetric 2 × 2 game described above, we have the
following results.
(i) If (a1, a1) is efficient, then it is infinitely stable.
(ii) If (a1, a1) is not efficient, then the efficient strategy profile (σ
∗, σ∗) is stable
if and only if B = C > A. In this case, there exists no strategy profile that
is stable of order greater than 1.
Proof. For (i), let (a1, a1) be efficient. Then, by Lemma 3.15, we must have 2A ≥
B + C and hence pi(a1, a1) ∈ P (pi(∆(S
2))). Moreover, if A > C, then (a1, a1) is
a strict Nash equilibrium. According to Theorem 3.13, we know that (a1, a1) is
infinitely stable. Next we show that if A ≤ C, there also exists an infinitely stable
configuration with the aggregate outcome (a1, a1).
Let (µ, b) be a monomorphic configuration for which the unique preference type
θ in suppµ satisfies θ(ai, aj) = 1 if (ai, aj) = (a2, a2) and θ(ai, aj) = 0 otherwise,
and bθ(θ) = a1. Let r ∈ Z
+, and let Θ˜ = {θ˜1, . . . , θ˜r} be introduced into the
population with E = {ε1, . . . , εr}. For b˜ ∈ B(supp(µ˜E ); b), the post-entry average
fitnesses of the incumbent type θ and any mutant type θ˜s are, respectively,
Πθ(µ˜
E ; b˜) = (1− ‖E‖1)A+
r∑
t=1
εtpi1
(
b˜(θ, θ˜t)
)
and
Π
θ˜s
(µ˜E ; b˜) = (1− ‖E‖1)pi1
(
b˜(θ˜s, θ)
)
+
r∑
t=1
εtpi1
(
b˜(θ˜s, θ˜t)
)
.
Case 1: B = A ≤ C. We get A = B = C since 2A ≥ B + C. If A = D, then
clearly Πθ(µ˜
E ; b˜) = Π
θ˜s
(µ˜E ; b˜) for every θ˜s ∈ Θ˜. Suppose that A > D, and let
b˜
θ˜s
(θ) = (ps, 1− ps) for s = 1, . . . , r. If ps < 1 for some s, then b˜θ(θ˜
s) = a2 and we
can conclude that Πθ(µ˜
E ; b˜) > Π
θ˜s
(µ˜E ; b˜) as long as ‖E‖1 is small enough. Thus,
we assume that b˜
θ˜s
(θ) = a1 for every θ˜
s ∈ Θ˜, and so Πθ(µ˜
E ; b˜) = A. Therefore,
Πθ(µ˜
E ; b˜) ≥ Π
θ˜s
(µ˜E ; b˜) for all θ˜s ∈ Θ˜, independently of E .
Case 2: B < A ≤ C. Let b˜
θ˜s
(θ) = (ps, 1−ps) for s = 1, . . . , r. If ps ∈ (0, 1) for some
s, then b˜θ(θ˜
s) = a2 and we have Πθ(µ˜
E ; b˜) > Π
θ˜s
(µ˜E ; b˜) as long as ‖E‖1 is small
10Dekel et al. (2007) show that efficiency of a pure strategy is sufficient for the corresponding
outcome to be stable in 2 × 2 games. Here, we further show that it is also sufficient for infinite
stability.
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enough. Therefore, for a given mutant type θ˜s, we assume that b˜
θ˜s
(θ) = a1 or a2.
When b˜
θ˜s
(θ) = a1, the incumbent type is indifferent between a1 and a2. However,
we will let b˜θ(θ˜
s) = a1, since otherwise we can conclude that Πθ(µ˜
E ; b˜) > Π
θ˜s
(µ˜E ; b˜)
if ‖E‖1 is sufficiently small.
For a given θ˜s, if b˜
θ˜s
(θ) = a2, then b˜θ(θ˜
s) = a2, and hence pi1
(
b˜(θ˜s, θ)
)
= D. If
A > D, we can again obtain that Πθ(µ˜
E ; b˜) > Π
θ˜s
(µ˜E ; b˜) as long as ‖E‖1 is small
enough. The only thing remaining in the case A > D is to assume that b˜
θ˜t
(θ) = a1
for all θ˜t ∈ Θ˜. Under our previous assumption that b˜θ(θ˜
t) = a1 if b˜θ˜t(θ) = a1, it
follows that for any θ˜s ∈ Θ˜, the difference between the average fitnesses of θ and
θ˜s is
Πθ(µ˜
E ; b˜)−Π
θ˜s
(µ˜E ; b˜) =
r∑
t=1
εt
[
pi1(a1, a1)− pi1
(
b˜(θ˜s, θ˜t)
)]
. (3.1)
As in the proof of Theorem 3.12, the condition pi(a1, a1) ∈ P (pi(∆(S
2))) implies
that Πθ(µ˜
E ; b˜) > Π
θ˜s
(µ˜E ; b˜) for some θ˜s ∈ Θ˜, or Πθ(µ˜
E ; b˜) = Π
θ˜s
(µ˜E ; b˜) for every
θ˜s ∈ Θ˜, independently of E .
Now suppose that A = D. Then, since we assume that b˜θ(θ˜
t) = a1 whenever
b˜
θ˜t
(θ) = a1, it holds that pi
(
b˜(θ˜t, θ)
)
= (A,A) for any θ˜t ∈ Θ˜, no matter what strat-
egy the mutant type θ˜t chooses from a1 and a2. Again, we obtain equation (3.1),
and so we can conclude that the mutation set Θ˜ fails to invade, or the incumbents
can coexist with the mutants. This completes the proof of part (i).
To prove part (ii), suppose that (a1, a1) is not efficient. Then, by Lemma 3.15,
the inequality 2A < B+C holds and the efficient strategy σ∗ is such that σ∗(a1) =
B+C−2D
2(B+C−A−D) , which will be denoted by α
∗. Let (µ, b) be a stable configuration
with the aggregate outcome (σ∗, σ∗). Since the efficient strategy here is unique,
according to part (i) of Theorem 3.10, bθ(θ) = σ
∗ for every θ ∈ supp(µ). Consider
an indifferent mutant type θ˜ entering the population with the population share ε.
For any b˜ ∈ B(supp(µ˜E ); b), the average fitness of θ˜ is
Π
θ˜
(µ˜E ; b˜) = (1− ε)
∑
θ∈supp(µ)
µ(θ)pi1
(
b˜(θ˜, θ)
)
+ εpi1
(
b˜(θ˜, θ˜)
)
.
Since (µ, b) is stable, the post-entry average fitness of any incumbent θ ∈ supp(µ)
can be written as
Πθ(µ˜
E ; b˜) = (1 − ε)pi1(σ
∗, σ∗) + εpi1
(˜
b(θ, θ˜)
)
.
Suppose that b˜
θ˜
(θ) = σ∗ for all θ ∈ supp(µ). Then each incumbent will be indiffer-
ent between a1 and a2, and we suppose that the equation b˜θ(θ˜) = (q, 1 − q) holds
for all θ ∈ supp(µ), where q ∈ [0, 1]. Under these assumptions, we have∑
θ∈supp(µ)
µ(θ)pi1
(˜
b(θ˜, θ)
)
= α∗qA+ α∗(1− q)B + (1− α∗)qC + (1− α∗)(1 − q)D.
Note that for any given q ∈ [0, 1], the stability of (µ, b) requires that pi1(σ
∗, σ∗) ≥∑
θ∈supp(µ) µ(θ)pi1
(
b˜(θ˜, θ)
)
. If q = 0, this condition induces that C ≥ B; if q = 1,
this condition induces that B ≥ C. Therefore, the efficient strategy profile (σ∗, σ∗)
being stable implies that B = C > A.
Conversely, suppose that B = C > A. Define a preference type θ∗ by θ∗(a1, a1) =
1 − α∗, θ∗(a2, a2) = α
∗, and θ∗(ai, aj) = 0 whenever ai 6= aj . Let (µ, b) be a
monomorphic configuration, where the population consists of θ∗ for which bθ∗(θ
∗) =
σ∗. Consider a mutant type θ˜ entering the population with the population share ε.
Let some b˜ ∈ B(supp(µ˜E); b) be given, and suppose that b˜
θ˜
(θ∗) = (p, 1 − p). Then
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b˜θ∗(θ˜) = a1 if p > α
∗; b˜θ∗(θ˜) = a2 if p < α
∗; the incumbent type θ∗ is indifferent
between a1 and a2 if p = α
∗. Comparing the post-entry average fitnesses of θ∗ and
θ˜, we obtain
Πθ∗(µ˜
E ; b˜)−Π
θ˜
(µ˜E ; b˜) = (1−ε)
[
pi1(σ
∗, σ∗)−pi1
(
b˜(θ˜, θ∗)
)]
+ε
[
pi1
(
b˜(θ∗, θ˜)
)
−pi1
(
b˜(θ˜, θ˜)
)]
.
If p > α∗, then, by applying B = C > A, we have
pi1(σ
∗, σ∗) = α∗A+ (1 − α∗)B > pA+ (1− p)B = pi1
(˜
b(θ˜, θ∗)
)
.
Similarly, when p < α∗, we also have pi1(σ
∗, σ∗) > pi1
(
b˜(θ˜, θ∗)
)
by applying B =
C > D. Thus, in both cases, Πθ∗(µ˜
E ; b˜) > Π
θ˜
(µ˜E ; b˜) as long as ε is small enough.
Finally, let p = α∗. Then, by B = C, it can be shown that
pi1
(˜
b(θ∗, θ˜)
)
= pi1
(
b˜(θ˜, θ∗)
)
= pi1(σ
∗, σ∗),
no matter what strategy the incumbent type θ∗ chooses. Clearly, the efficiency
property of (σ∗, σ∗) implies that Πθ∗(µ˜
E ; b˜) ≥ Π
θ˜
(µ˜E ; b˜), independently of ε. Hence,
(σ∗, σ∗) is a stable aggregate outcome.
In addition, we see that when (a1, a1) is not efficient, the unique stable strategy
profile (σ∗, σ∗) has the property that pi(σ∗, σ∗) /∈ P (pi(∆(S)2)). Therefore, by
Lemma 3.4 and part (ii) of Theorem 3.10, there exists no strategy profile that is
stable of order greater than 1 in this case. 
4. The Multi-population Case
In this section, we study evolutionarily stable preferences against multiple mu-
tations in multiple populations. Suppose that there are n separate populations
consisting of an infinite number of individuals. In every match, n players are drawn
independently, one at random from each population, to play the game. Denote by
M(Θn) the set of all joint distributions of n independent random variables defined
on the same sample space Θ with finite support. Let µ ∈ M(Θn). Then the sup-
port of µ can be written as supp(µ) =
∏
i∈N supp(µi), where µi is the preference
distribution over all types of players in the i-th population.
For a given µ ∈ M(Θn), interactions among any n players in supp(µ) are
characterized by the n-player game Γ(µ), and the pair [(N, (Ai), (pii)),Γ(µ)] is re-
ferred to as an environment. Note that the game (N, (Ai), (pii)) can be symmetric
or asymmetric. A strategy adopted by a player i is a function bi : supp(µ) →
∆(Ai). The vector-valued function b : supp(µ)→
∏
i∈N ∆(Ai) is defined by b(θ) =
(b1(θ), . . . , bn(θ)). We say b an equilibrium in the game Γ(µ) if for any θ ∈ supp(µ),
the strategy profile b(θ) is a Nash equilibrium of the resulting strategic game played
by θ, that is, for each i ∈ N ,
bi(θ) ∈ argmax
σi∈∆(Ai)
θi
(
σi, b(θ)−i
)
.
We denote by B(supp(µ)) the set of all such equilibria in Γ(µ).
For µ ∈ M(Θn) and b ∈ B(supp(µ)), the pair (µ, b) is called a configuration,
and the aggregate outcome of (µ, b) is the correlated strategy ϕµ,b satisfying
ϕµ,b(a1, . . . , an) =
∑
θ∈supp(µ)
µ(θ)
∏
i∈N
bi(θ)(ai)
for every (a1, . . . , an) ∈ A, where bi(θ)(ai) denotes the probability that bi(θ) assigns
to ai. A strategy profile σ ∈
∏
i∈N ∆(Ai) is called an aggregate outcome if the
induced correlated strategy ϕσ is the aggregate outcome of some configuration. For
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i ∈ N , the average fitness of a type θi ∈ supp(µi) with respect to (µ, b) is given by
Πθi(µ; b) =
∑
θ′
−i
∈supp(µ−i)
µ−i(θ
′
−i)pii
(
b(θi, θ
′
−i)
)
,
where µ−i(θ
′
−i) and supp(µ−i) denote µ(θ
′
−i|θi) and
∏
j 6=i supp(µj), respectively.
As in Section 3, a configuration (µ, b) is said to be balanced if for each i ∈ N , the
equality Πθi(µ; b) = Πθ′i(µ; b) holds for every θi, θ
′
i ∈ suppµi.
Suppose that µ ∈ M(Θn) is the joint preference distribution over all incumbent
types in all n populations. Let J = {i1, . . . , ik} be any nonempty subset of N . For
every j ∈ J , suppose that there are mj distinct mutations θ˜
1
j , . . . , θ˜
mj
j , where each
θ˜sj /∈ supp(µj), introduced into the j-th population simultaneously with population
shares ε1j , . . . , ε
mj
j , respectively. We will write mJ for the k-tuple (mi1 , . . . ,mik) ∈
(Z+)k, and define ‖mJ‖∞ = maxj∈J mj . Let Θ˜(mJ) denote
∏
j∈J Θ˜j where Θ˜j
refers to a set {θ˜1j , . . . , θ˜
mj
j }, and call it an m-th order mutation set if ‖mJ‖∞ = m.
Let E(mJ ) denote
∏
j∈J Ej where Ej refers to a multiset {ε
1
j , . . . , ε
mj
j }. In addition,
denote ε1j + · · · + ε
mj
j by ‖Ej‖1, and define ‖E(mJ )‖∞ = maxj∈J ‖Ej‖1. Then,
after an entry, the post-entry distribution of preferences in each i-th population is
represented by
µ˜
E(mJ )
i =
{
(1 − ‖Ei‖1)µi + ε
1
i δθ˜1
i
+ · · ·+ εmii δθ˜mi
i
if i ∈ J ,
µi if i ∈ N \ J ,
where δ
θ˜s
i
is the degenerate distribution concentrated at θ˜si for s = 1, . . . ,mi. Again,
the notations Θ˜, E , and µ˜E may be used in place of Θ˜(mJ ), E(mJ ), and µ˜
E(mJ ),
respectively.
Next, we extend the definitions of a focal equilibrium and of stability to the
multi-population setting.
Definition 4.1. Let (µ, b) be a configuration in [(N, (Ai), (pii)),Γ(µ)], and suppose
that a mutation set Θ˜(mJ) with E(mJ ) is introduced. In Γ(µ˜
E), a post-entry
equilibrium b˜ ∈ B(supp(µ˜E)) is focal relative to b if b˜(θ) = b(θ) for every θ ∈
supp(µ). Let B(supp(µ˜E); b) be the set of all focal equilibria relative to b in Γ(µ˜E),
called a focal set. 11
As in the single-population setting, we allow for all preferences satisfying the von
Neumann-Morgenstern axioms to evolve in each population. All mutants need to
be distinguishable from the incumbents. In particular, if different individuals have
the same preference relation, then their preferences can be represented by different
utility functions congruent modulo a positive affine transformation.
Definition 4.2. In [(N, (Ai), (pii)),Γ(µ)], a configuration (µ, b) is said to be multi-
mutation stable of order m, or m-th order stable, if it is balanced, and if for any
Θ˜(mJ) with ‖mJ‖∞ = m and for any b˜ ∈ B(supp(µ˜
E ); b), there is some ε¯ ∈ (0, 1)
such that for every E(mJ ) with ‖E(mJ )‖∞ ∈ (0, ε¯), either (i) or (ii) is satisfied.
(i) Πθj(µ˜
E ; b˜) > Π
θ˜s
j
(µ˜E ; b˜) for some j ∈ J , some θ˜sj ∈ Θ˜j , and all θj ∈
supp(µj).
(ii) Πθi(µ˜
E ; b˜) = Π
θ̂i
(µ˜E ; b˜) for every i ∈ N and every θi, θ̂i ∈ supp(µ˜
E
i ).
11In the multi-population setting, the focal set is always nonempty, and the post-entry aggre-
gate outcome can be made arbitrarily close to the pre-entry one, as described in the remark of
Definition 3.2.
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If (µ, b) is stable of order 1, it is said simply to be stable. If (µ, b) is stable of all
orders, it is said to be infinitely stable. We call a strategy profile σ ∈
∏
i∈N ∆(Ai)
multi-mutation stable of order m, orm-th order stable, if it is the aggregate outcome
of an m-th order stable configuration.
Unsurprisingly, a multi-mutation stable configuration can be held stable of lower
orders in the multi-population setting. The proof is just like the proof of Lemma 3.4
with additional populations.
Lemma 4.3. If a configuration (µ, b) is stable of order l with l > 1, then it is stable
of order r for any r < l.
The converse of Lemma 4.3 is not a true statement, as the next example shows.
Example 4.4. Suppose that the fitness assignment is represented by the following
two-player game G with the material payoff function pi. The set of actions available
to each player i is Ai = {ai1, ai2, ai3}.
a21 a22 a23
a11 7, 7 0, 0 0, 0
a12 0, 0 9, 6 0, 0
a13 0, 0 0, 0 6, 9
We claim that (a11, a21) is stable of order 1, but not of order 2. It is easy to check
that (a11, a21) is a strict Nash equilibrium of G, and the payoff profile pi(a11, a21)
is actually on the Pareto frontier of pi
(
∆(A1) × ∆(A2)
)
. Suppose that ai1 is the
strictly dominant strategy for the incumbents in each i-th population. Then any
mutant type with a sufficiently small population share will be driven out if the
mutants choose any other strategy when matched against the incumbents. When
two mutants from different populations are matched, Pareto efficiency implies that
the fitness of one mutant cannot be improved without the worsening of the other
mutant’s fitness. Thus, the strategy profile (a11, a21) is a stable aggregate outcome;
see also Theorem 4.7.
To see that (a11, a21) is not stable of order 2, let (µ, b) be a configuration with the
aggregate outcome (a11, a21). Then b(θ) = (a11, a21) for all θ ∈ supp(µ). For every
i ∈ {1, 2}, consider the mutant types θ˜1i and θ˜
2
i entering the i-th population with
the properties: (i) when matched against the incumbents, b˜(θ˜si , θ−i) = (a11, a21) for
s = 1, 2; (ii) when matched against themselves, b˜(θ˜11 , θ˜
1
2) = (a12, a22), b˜(θ˜
1
1, θ˜
2
2) =
(a13, a23), b˜(θ˜
2
1 , θ˜
1
2) = (a13, a23), and b˜(θ˜
2
1, θ˜
2
2) = (a12, a22). Let ε
s
i = ε ∈ (0, 1) for
all i, s ∈ {1, 2}. Then for each i ∈ {1, 2}, the post-entry average fitness of any
incumbent θi is Πθi(µ˜
E ; b˜) = 7. On the other hand, for s ∈ {1, 2}, the average
fitness of the mutant type θ˜si is
Π
θ˜s
i
(µ˜E ; b˜) = (1− 2ε) · 7 + ε · (9 + 6) = 7 + ε.
Thus Π
θ˜s
i
(µ˜E ; b˜) > Πθi(µ˜
E ; b˜) for all i, s ∈ {1, 2} no matter what ε is, that is, the
strategy profile (a11, a21) is not stable of order 2.
To examine the features of multi-population stability, we need the concept of
Pareto efficiency defined in payoff regions. To simplify notation, we will write the
two payoff regions as Snc and Sco instead of as pi
(∏
i∈N ∆(Ai)
)
and pi
(
∆(
∏
i∈N Ai)
)
,
respectively. 12 Then, certainly, Snc ⊆ Sco. It is clear that the set Sco is the convex
12In other words, for an n-player game, the notations Snc and Sco are used to refer to the the
noncooperative payoff region and the cooperative payoff region, respectively.
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hull of the set pi(
∏
i∈N Ai) of pure-payoff profiles. Let S
Q
co be the set of convex
combinations of payoff points in pi(
∏
i∈N Ai) with rational coefficients. Then S
Q
co is
dense in Sco. Similarly, we denote by S
Q
nc the set of payoff profiles achievable with
rational mixed-strategy profiles. 13 Then SQnc ⊆ S
Q
co, and S
Q
nc is dense in Snc.
For a stable configuration in the multi-population model with complete informa-
tion, Tu and Juang (2018) reveal that the payoff profile of an equilibrium outcome
adopted by any n matched incumbents must be on the Pareto frontier of the nonco-
operative payoff region; moreover, the form of Pareto efficiency is unique to a given
stable configuration, as presented in Proposition 4.5. 14 Here, we further show that
a sufficiently high-order stable configuration can be such that all adopted strategy
profiles will correspond to the same payoff vector located on the Pareto frontier of
the cooperative payoff region.
Proposition 4.5. Let (µ, b) be a stable configuration in [(N, (Ai), (pii)),Γ(µ)] with
the aggregate outcome ϕµ,b. Then for each i ∈ N , the relations
pii(ϕµ,b) = pii
(
b(θ)
)
= Πθ¯i(µ; b)
hold for any θ ∈ supp(µ) and any θ¯i ∈ supp(µi).
Let z = (z1, . . . , zn) and x = (x1, . . . , xn) be two n-tuples. For any subset T ⊆ N ,
it is convenient to write (zT , x−T ) for the new n-tuple defined as (zT , x−T )i = zi if
i ∈ T and (zT , x−T )i = xi otherwise.
Theorem 4.6. Let (µ, b) be a configuration in [(N, (Ai), (pii)),Γ(µ)].
(i) If (µ, b) is stable, then pi
(
b(θ)
)
∈ P (Snc) for every θ ∈ supp(µ).
(ii) If (µ, b) is infinitely stable and pi
(
b(θ)
)
∈ SQnc where θ ∈ supp(µ), then
pi
(
b(θ)
)
∈ P (SQco).
Proof. To prove (i), suppose that there is θ¯ ∈ supp(µ) with pi
(
b(θ)
)
/∈ P (Snc).
Then there exists σ ∈
∏
i∈N ∆(Ai) such that pii(σ) ≥ pii
(
b(θ¯)
)
for all i ∈ N and
pik(σ) > pik
(
b(θ¯)
)
for some k ∈ N . For each i-th population, consider an indifferent
mutant type θ˜i entering the population. Let b˜ ∈ B(supp(µ˜
E); b) satisfy (1) b˜(θ˜) = σ;
(2) for any T  N and any θ−T ∈ supp(µ−T ), we have b˜(θ˜T , θ−T ) = b(θ¯T , θ−T ).
Then, for each i ∈ N , the difference between the average fitnesses of θ˜i and θ¯i is
Π
θ˜i
(µ˜E ; b˜)−Πθ¯i(µ˜
E ; b˜) = µ˜E−i(θ˜−i)
[
pii(σ) − pii
(
b(θ¯)
)]
.
Thus, Π
θ˜i
(µ˜E ; b˜) ≥ Πθ¯i(µ˜
E ; b˜) for all i ∈ N , and Π
θ˜k
(µ˜E ; b˜) > Πθ¯k(µ˜
E ; b˜) for some
k ∈ N , no matter what the mutants’ population shares are. This means that (µ, b)
is not stable.
For part (ii), suppose that there is θ¯ ∈ supp(µ) with pi
(
b(θ¯)
)
∈ SQnc \ P (S
Q
co).
Then we can choose a payoff point u ∈ SQco satisfying ui ≥ pii
(
b(θ¯)
)
for all i ∈ N
and uk > pik
(
b(θ¯)
)
for some k ∈ N . Note that u is a rational convex combination
of payoff points in pi(
∏
i∈N Ai). Thus, for every i-th population, a sufficiently large
mutation set Θ˜i = {θ˜
1
i , . . . , θ˜
mi
i } with Ei = {ε
1
i , . . . , ε
mi
i } can be introduced such
that the post-entry strategies satisfy the following properties.
• For each i ∈ N , the equality∑
θ˜−i∈Θ˜−i
µ˜E−i(θ˜−i)pii
(
b˜(θ˜si , θ˜−i)
)
=
∑
θ˜−i∈Θ˜−i
µ˜E−i(θ˜−i)ui
13A mixed strategy σi for player i is rational if all values of σi are rational numbers. A
mixed-strategy profile σ is rational if all its mixed strategies are rational.
14The value of the invasion barrier ε¯ appearing in the stability criterion in Tu and Juang (2018)
is independent of any post-entry equilibrium. But the same necessary results also hold for the
weaker criterion defined in this paper.
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holds for every θ˜si ∈ Θ˜i.
15
• For any θ ∈ supp(µ), any θ˜ ∈ Θ˜, and any T  N , we have b˜(θ˜T , θ−T ) =
b(θ¯T , θ−T ).
Then, for each i ∈ N and each θ˜si ∈ Θ˜i, the difference between the average fitnesses
of θ˜si and θ¯i is
Π
θ˜s
i
(µ˜E ; b˜)−Πθ¯i(µ˜
E ; b˜) =
∑
θ˜−i∈Θ˜−i
µ˜E−i(θ˜−i)
[
pii
(
b˜(θ˜si , θ˜−i)
)
− pii
(˜
b(θ¯i, θ˜−i)
)]
=
∑
θ˜−i∈Θ˜−i
µ˜E−i(θ˜−i)
[
ui − pii
(
b(θ¯)
)]
.
So, for any ε¯ ∈ (0, 1), we can find proper relations among the mutants’ population
shares with ‖E‖∞ ∈ (0, ε¯) such that Πθ˜s
i
(µ˜E ; b˜) ≥ Πθ¯i(µ˜
E ; b˜) for all i ∈ N and all
θ˜si ∈ Θ˜i, and the above inequality is strict for some k-th population. Thus, the
configuration (µ, b) is not infinitely stable. 
Remark. According to Lemma 4.3, if (µ, b) is infinitely stable and pi
(
b(θ)
)
∈ SQnc,
then pi
(
b(θ)
)
∈ P (Snc) ∩ P (S
Q
co). In particular, when N = {1, 2}, it can be shown
that pi
(
b(θ)
)
∈ P (SQco) implies pi
(
b(θ)
)
∈ P (Sco); see Tu and Juang (2017).
Next, we focus on finding sufficient conditions for multi-mutation stability, be-
ginning with the case N = {1, 2}. Example 4.4 indicates that in an arbitrary
two-player game, a strict Nash equilibrium with the payoff vector on P (Snc) may
be stable, and that we require stronger conditions to ensure higher-order stability.
Theorem 4.7. Let (a∗1, a
∗
2) be a strict Nash equilibrium of ({1, 2}, (Ai), (pii)).
(i) If pi(a∗1, a
∗
2) ∈ P (Snc), then (a
∗
1, a
∗
2) is stable.
(ii) If pi(a∗1, a
∗
2) ∈ P (Sco), then (a
∗
1, a
∗
2) is infinitely stable.
Proof. Suppose that (a∗1, a
∗
2) is a strict Nash equilibrium of ({1, 2}, (Ai), (pii)). Let
(µ, b) be a configuration where each i-th population consists of θ∗i for which a
∗
i is
the strictly dominant strategy. Let J be a nonempty subset of {1, 2}. For j ∈ J
and mj ∈ Z
+, consider a mutation set Θ˜j = {θ˜
1
j , . . . , θ˜
mj
j } with Ej = {ε
1
j , . . . , ε
mj
j }
appearing in the j-th population. In the case where |J | = 1, it is clear that mutants
have no evolutionary advantage, since (a∗1, a
∗
2) is a strict Nash equilibrium.
Let J = {1, 2}, and let b˜ ∈ B(supp(µ˜E); b). For every i ∈ {1, 2}, the post-entry
average fitness of the incumbent type θ∗i is
Πθ∗
i
(µ˜E ; b˜) = (1− ‖E−i‖1)pii(a
∗
1, a
∗
2) +
m−i∑
t=1
εt−ipii
(
a∗i , b˜−i(θ
∗
i , θ˜
t
−i)
)
.16
On the other hand, for given i ∈ {1, 2} and for each s ∈ {1, . . . ,mi}, the average
fitness of the mutant type θ˜si is
Π
θ˜s
i
(µ˜E ; b˜) = (1− ‖E−i‖1)pii
(˜
bi(θ˜
s
i , θ
∗
−i), a
∗
−i
)
+
m−i∑
t=1
εt−ipii
(
b˜(θ˜si , θ˜
t
−i)
)
.
Suppose that b˜i(θ˜
s
i , θ
∗
−i) 6= a
∗
i for some i ∈ {1, 2} and some θ˜
s
i ∈ Θ˜i. Then, since
(a∗1, a
∗
2) is a strict Nash equilibrium, we have Πθ∗i (µ˜
E ; b˜) > Π
θ˜s
i
(µ˜E ; b˜) as long as
15This is shown in Appendix A.
16Here, the subscript −i on E−i, m−i, εt
−i
, and b˜−i denotes the population index j with
j ∈ {1, 2} \ {i}, and the pair (θ∗
i
, θ˜t
−i
) refers to the ordered pair consisting of two preference types
arranged in ascending order according to their population indices. These ideas are applied to
other notations in a similar way.
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‖E−i‖1 is small enough. Next, suppose that b˜i(θ˜
s
i , θ
∗
−i) = a
∗
i for all i ∈ {1, 2} and
all θ˜si ∈ Θ˜i. Then the difference between the average fitnesses of θ
∗
i and θ˜
s
i is
Πθ∗
i
(µ˜E ; b˜)−Π
θ˜s
i
(µ˜E ; b˜) =
m−i∑
t=1
εt−i
[
pii(a
∗
1, a
∗
2)− pii
(
b˜(θ˜si , θ˜
t
−i)
)]
.
To prove part (i), consider the case where m1 = m2 = 1. Then the claim follows
directly from the fact that pi(a∗1, a
∗
2) ∈ P (Snc). For part (ii), we first define a payoff
point u ∈ Sco by
u =
m1∑
r1=1
m2∑
r2=1
εr11 ε
r2
2∑m1
r1=1
∑m2
r2=1
εr11 ε
r2
2
pi
(
b˜(θ˜r11 , θ˜
r2
2 )
)
.
Since pi(a∗1, a
∗
2) ∈ P (Sco), we have pi(a
∗
1, a
∗
2) = u or pii(a
∗
1, a
∗
2) > ui for some i ∈
{1, 2}. Note that the payoff point u can be written as
u =
m1∑
r1=1
εr11∑m1
r1=1
εr11
m2∑
r2=1
εr22∑m2
r2=1
εr22
pi
(
b˜(θ˜r11 , θ˜
r2
2 )
)
=
m2∑
r2=1
εr22∑m2
r2=1
εr22
m1∑
r1=1
εr11∑m1
r1=1
εr11
pi
(
b˜(θ˜r11 , θ˜
r2
2 )
)
.
Therefore, we can conclude that
pii(a
∗
1, a
∗
2) =
m−i∑
t=1
εt−i∑m−i
t=1 ε
t
−i
pii
(
b˜(θ˜si , θ˜
t
−i)
)
for every i ∈ {1, 2} and every θ˜si ∈ Θ˜i, or
pii(a
∗
1, a
∗
2) >
m−i∑
t=1
εt−i∑m−i
t=1 ε
t
−i
pii
(
b˜(θ˜si , θ˜
t
−i)
)
for some i ∈ {1, 2} and some θ˜si ∈ Θ˜i. It follows that Πθ∗i (µ˜
E ; b˜) = Π
θ˜s
i
(µ˜E ; b˜) for
all i ∈ {1, 2} and all θ˜si ∈ Θ˜i, or Πθ∗i (µ˜
E ; b˜) > Π
θ˜s
i
(µ˜E ; b˜) for some i ∈ {1, 2} and
some θ˜si ∈ Θ˜i, independently of E . Thus the configuration (µ, b) is infinitely stable,
which completes the proof. 
Example 4.8. Reconsider the two-player game G from Example 4.4. The strategy
profile (a11, a21) is stable, but not stable of order 2. In fact, it is not hard to
see that P (Snc) = {(7, 7), (9, 6), (6, 9)} and P (Sco) ∩ Snc = {(9, 6), (6, 9)}. Now,
by Theorem 4.6 (i) and Theorem 4.7 (i), all stable strategy profiles are (a11, a21),
(a12, a22), and (a13, a23). Moreover, we can apply Lemma 4.3 and Theorem 4.6 to
obtain that the payoff points of infinitely stable strategy profiles in this game G
must be located on P (Sco) ∩ Snc. Then by Theorem 4.7 (ii), we conclude that all
infinitely stable strategy profiles are (a12, a22) and (a13, a23).
When the number of populations is greater than or equal to three, mutants
may gain evolutionary advantages, directly or indirectly, over the incumbents by
various correlated deviations. This would imply that a Pareto-efficient strict Nash
equilibrium may not be stable, even though every deviation will damage all deviants.
The following examples of three-player games exhibit how multiple populations
interact with one another to destabilize Pareto-efficient strict Nash equilibria. 17 It
will provide suggestions for making a sufficient condition for stability in the most
general multi-population setting.
17These examples are essentially the same as the ones used in Tu and Juang (2018).
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Example 4.9. Let the fitness assignment be characterized by the following three-
player game, and suppose that the set of actions available to each player i is
{ai1, ai2}.
a21 a22
a11 7, 7, 7 3, 1, 3
a12 1, 3, 3 7, 7, 0
a31
a21 a22
a11 1, 3, 3 0, 0, 0
a12 0, 0, 0 7, 7, 0
a32
Then (a11, a21, a31) is a strict Nash equilibrium which weakly Pareto dominates all
other strategy profiles, and thus the payoff point of (a11, a21, a31) lies on P (Sco).
However, we can introduce a mutation set to destabilize this equilibrium. Let
(µ, b) be a configuration with the aggregate outcome (a11, a21, a31), so that b(θ) =
(a11, a21, a31) for all θ ∈ supp(µ). Consider three indifferent mutant types θ˜1,
θ˜2, and θ˜3 entering the three populations, respectively. Suppose that the focal
equilibrium b˜ satisfies the conditions: (1) b˜(θ̂1, θ̂2, θ̂3) = (a12, a22, σ3) if θ̂1 = θ˜1,
θ̂2 = θ˜2, and θ̂3 is an incumbent in supp(µ3) adopting a strategy σ3 ∈ ∆({a31, a32});
(2) otherwise b˜(θ̂1, θ̂2, θ̂3) = (a11, a21, a31).
It is easy to verify that no matter what the mutants’ population shares are and
no matter what the strategy σ3 an incumbent in the third population adopts, we
have Π
θ˜1
(µ˜E ; b˜) = Πθ1(µ˜
E ; b˜), Π
θ˜2
(µ˜E ; b˜) = Πθ2(µ˜
E ; b˜), and Π
θ˜3
(µ˜E ; b˜) > Πθ3(µ˜
E ; b˜)
for all incumbents θ1, θ2, and θ3. Thus (a11, a21, a31) cannot be a stable aggregate
outcome.
The above example shows that for a strict Nash equilibrium in a three-player
game, there may be a correlated deviation that does not damage any one of de-
viants, and so the mutants could hurt the incumbents without any expense. On the
other hand, in the following example, we will see how mutants have evolutionary
advantages even though any deviation will incur a loss.
Example 4.10. Let the following three-player game represent the fitness assign-
ment, and let {ai1, ai2} be the action set of player i for i = 1, 2, 3.
a21 a22
a11 7, 7, 7 9, 6, 0
a12 6, 0, 9 6, 0, 9
a31
a21 a22
a11 0, 9, 6 9, 6, 0
a12 0, 9, 6 1, 1, 1
a32
In this game, there are additional conditions imposed on the Pareto-efficient strict
Nash equilibrium (a11, a21, a31): the fitnesses of all deviants will be reduced for
any deviation. Even so, the strategy profile (a11, a21, a31) is not stable. To verify
this, let (a11, a21, a31) be the aggregate outcome of a configuration (µ, b). For
each i, consider an indifferent mutant type θ˜i entering the i-th population with a
population share εi, and suppose that the adopted focal equilibrium b˜ satisfies the
conditions: for any (θ1, θ2, θ3) ∈ supp(µ),
b˜(θ˜1, θ2, θ3) = b˜(θ1, θ˜2, θ3) = b˜(θ1, θ2, θ˜3) = b˜(θ˜1, θ˜2, θ˜3) = (a11, a21, a31),
b˜1(θ˜1, θ˜2, θ3) = a11, b˜2(θ˜1, θ˜2, θ3) = a22,
b˜1(θ˜1, θ2, θ˜3) = a12, b˜3(θ˜1, θ2, θ˜3) = a31,
b˜2(θ1, θ˜2, θ˜3) = a21, b˜3(θ1, θ˜2, θ˜3) = a32.
EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE PREFERENCES AGAINST MULTIPLE MUTATIONS 21
Let εi = ε0 for all i. Then, for any ε0 > 0 and for i = 1, 2, 3, the difference between
the average fitnesses of θ˜i and θi is
Π
θ˜i
(µ˜E ; b˜)−Πθi(µ˜
E ; b˜) = ε0 + 6ε
2
0 > 0,
and hence the strategy profile (a11, a21, a31) is not stable.
Examples 4.9 and 4.10 give us some clues about the sufficient condition for sta-
bility in the most general multi-population setting. These considerations motivate
our new definition.
Definition 4.11. Let (N, (Ai), (pii)) be a finite strategic game. A strategy profile x
is a strictly strong Nash equilibrium if for any J ⊆ N and for any σJ ∈
∏
j∈J ∆(Aj)
with σJ 6= xJ , there exists some k ∈ J such that pik(x) > pik(σJ , x−J ). In addition,
we say that a strategy profile σ weakly Pareto dominates σ′ if pii(σ) ≥ pii(σ
′) for
all i ∈ N .
Theorem 4.12. Let a∗ be a strictly strong Nash equilibrium of (N, (Ai), (pii)), and
suppose that a∗ weakly Pareto dominates all strategy profiles. Then a∗ is infinitely
stable.
Proof. Suppose that each i-th population consists of θ∗i for which a
∗
i is the strictly
dominant strategy, and we denote this configuration by (µ, b). Let J be a nonempty
subset of N . For j ∈ J and mj ∈ Z
+, consider a mutation set Θ˜j = {θ˜
1
j , . . . , θ˜
mj
j }
with Ej = {ε
1
j , . . . , ε
mj
j } entering the j-th population. Since a
∗ is a strictly strong
Nash equilibrium, the conclusion of the case |J | = 1 is obvious, and hence we
suppose that |J | ≥ 2.
Let b˜ ∈ B(supp(µ˜E); b) be chosen. For each i ∈ J , the post-entry average fitness
of the incumbent type θ∗i is
Πθ∗
i
(µ˜E ; b˜) =
|J−i|∑
k=0
∑
|T |=k
T⊆J−i
∑
θ˜T∈Θ˜T
[
µ˜ET (θ˜T )
∏
j∈J−i\T
(1− ‖Ej‖1)
]
pii
(
b˜(θ˜T , θ
∗
−T )
)
,
or equivalently,
Πθ∗
i
(µ˜E ; b˜) =
[ ∏
j∈J−i
(1− ‖Ej‖1)
]
pii
(
b˜(θ)
)
(4.1)
+
∑
|T |=1
T⊆J−i
∑
θ˜T∈Θ˜T
[
µ˜ET (θ˜T )
∏
j∈J−i\T
(1 − ‖Ej‖1)
]
pii
(
b˜(θ˜T , θ
∗
−T )
)
+ · · ·+
∑
θ˜J−i
∈Θ˜J−i
µ˜EJ−i(θ˜J−i)pii
(
b˜(θ˜J−i , θ
∗
−J−i)
)
.
Here J−i = J \ {i}, Θ˜T =
∏
j∈T Θ˜j , and µ˜
E
T (θ˜T ) =
∏
j∈T µ˜
E
j (θ˜
sj
j ) whenever θ˜T =
(θ˜
sj
j )j∈T . Similarly, for given i ∈ J and for each s ∈ {1, . . . ,mi}, the average fitness
of the mutant type θ˜si can be written as
Π
θ˜s
i
(µ˜E ; b˜) =
[ ∏
j∈J−i
(1 − ‖Ej‖1)
]
pii
(
b˜(θ˜si , θ
∗
−i)
)
(4.2)
+
∑
|T |=1
T⊆J−i
∑
θ˜T∈Θ˜T
[
µ˜ET (θ˜T )
∏
j∈J−i\T
(1− ‖Ej‖1)
]
pii
(
b˜(θ˜si , (θ˜T , θ
∗
−T )−i)
)
+ · · ·+
∑
θ˜J−i
∈Θ˜J−i
µ˜EJ−i(θ˜J−i)pii
(
b˜(θ˜si , θ˜J−i , θ
∗
−J)
)
.
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Suppose that b˜(θ˜si , θ
∗
−i) 6= a
∗ for some i ∈ J and some θ˜si ∈ Θ˜i, and compare
the first term on the right side of (4.1) with that on the right side of (4.2).
Because a∗ is a strictly strong Nash equilibrium, and the equalities b˜(θ) = a∗
and b˜(θ˜si , θ
∗
−i)−i = a
∗
−i hold under our assumptions, it follows that Πθ∗i (µ˜
E ; b˜) >
Π
θ˜s
i
(µ˜E ; b˜) if maxj∈J−i ‖Ej‖1 is sufficiently small. Then this mutation set fails to
invade. Otherwise, we set b˜(θ˜si , θ
∗
−i) = a
∗ for all i ∈ J and all θ˜si ∈ Θ˜i, and compare
the second term on the right side of (4.1) with that on the right side of (4.2). We
obtain, for each i ∈ J and for all T ⊆ J−i with |T | = 1,
b˜(θ˜T , θ
∗
−T ) = a
∗
for every θ˜T ∈ Θ˜T . Again suppose that for some i ∈ J and some θ˜
s
i ∈ Θ˜i, we have
b˜(θ˜si , (θ˜T , θ
∗
−T )−i) 6= a
∗ for some T ⊆ J−i with |T | = 1 and for some θ˜T ∈ Θ˜T . Let
T = {i′}, and let θ˜T = θ˜
s′
i′ for some s
′ ∈ {1, . . . ,mi′}. For the same reason as in the
above case T = ∅, we get pij(a
∗) > pij
(˜
b(θ˜si , θ˜
s′
i′ , θ
∗
−{i,i′})
)
for some j ∈ {i, i′}. With-
out loss of generality, assume that j = i. Besides, since a∗ weakly Pareto dominates
all strategy profiles, it follows that pii(a
∗) ≥ pii
(
b˜(θ˜si , (θ˜T , θ
∗
−T )−i)
)
for all T ⊆ J−i
with |T | = 1 and for all θ˜T ∈ Θ˜T . Hence Πθ∗
i
(µ˜E ; b˜) > Π
θ˜s
i
(µ˜E ; b˜) if maxj∈J−i ‖Ej‖1
is sufficiently small, and so this mutation set fails to invade. Otherwise, we assume
that for each i ∈ J and each θ˜si ∈ Θ˜i, we have b˜(θ˜
s
i , (θ˜T , θ
∗
−T )−i) = a
∗ for all
T ⊆ J−i with |T | = 1 and for all θ˜T ∈ Θ˜T . Then we compare the third term on
the right side of (4.1) with that on the right side of (4.2).
Continue this process. Since there are only finite terms in each sum, eventually
we will reach the conclusion. That is, for any b˜ ∈ B(supp(µ˜E); b), there exists
ε¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that for every E with ‖E‖∞ ∈ (0, ε¯), we have Πθ∗
i
(µ˜E ; b˜) > Π
θ˜s
i
(µ˜E ; b˜)
for some i ∈ J and some θ˜si ∈ Θ˜i, or Πθ∗i (µ˜
E ; b˜) = Π
θ˜s
i
(µ˜E ; b˜) for every i ∈ J and
every θ˜si ∈ Θ˜i. Thus, a
∗ is an infinitely stable aggregate outcome. 
5. Discussion
We study evolutionarily stable preferences against multiple mutations in the
single- and multi-population settings, respectively. A mutation set rather than
a single mutant type is regarded as a unit of mutation. A configuration is r-th
order stable if after an r-th order mutation set is introduced, either all mutants
coexist with the incumbents or there is at least one mutant type which will become
extinct. As expected, the efficiency levels of stable outcomes increase as the orders
of stability increase. Here we also describe specific relations between them.
In the single-population model, we show that the third order stability is equiv-
alent to the infinite order stability if symmetric two-player games are considered.
But unlike the benefit conferred by the symmetric payoff region for a symmetric
game, the analogous result for the multi-population case is uncertain. In addi-
tion, the necessary condition for higher-order stability in a general n-player game
is based on the additional assumption that only rational convex combinations of
pure strategies are allowed.
It is worth noting that the number of players will influence how we determine
the sufficient conditions for stability. In our multi-population setting, we show that
if the number of populations increases, a Pareto-efficient, strictly strong Nash equi-
librium can be destabilized by mutants coming from a first order mutation set. To
ensure the stability for multi-population settings, we have to make sure that there
exist no correlated deviations such that no matter what strategies the incumbents
adopt, the average fitnesses available to mutants are at least as high as the average
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fitnesses of the corresponding incumbents with at least one strict inequality. The
sufficient condition that we provide for more than two separate populations seems
too strong. There should be alternatives which impose constraints more precisely
on the behavior of mutants.
Finally, if two-player games in the single-population case are extended to n-player
games, it is not hard to verify that an efficient, strictly strong Nash equilibrium
is stable. Unlike in the multi-population model, such a natural extension of the
sufficient condition for the first order stability can be achieved, because every mu-
tant type a mutant can encounter is himself. However, if multiple mutations are
introduced, then correlated deviations may benefit all mutants on average, and
so a stable outcome may fail to exist. For example, let the fitness assignment be
characterized by a symmetric three-player game as follows.
a1 a2
a1 3, 3, 3 0, 0, 0
a2 0, 0, 0 1, 1, 6
a1
a1 a2
a1 0, 0, 0 6, 1, 1
a2 1, 6, 1 0, 0, 0
a2
Then (a1, a1, a1) is a strictly strong Nash equilibrium with the payoff vector on the
Pareto frontier of the cooperative payoff region. Even so, it can be destabilized by
two mutant types θ˜1 and θ˜2 with the following strategies: each θ˜i adopts a2 if his
opponents are the two distinct mutant types θ˜1 and θ˜2, and adopts a1 otherwise.
Thus, when the number of players increases in the single-population setting, a
higher-order stable outcome requires stronger sufficient conditions, as discussed in
the multi-population case.
Appendix A.
Here we prove the statement, given in the proof of Theorem 4.6, that if u is a
rational convex combination of payoff points in pi(
∏
i∈N Ai), then we can choose a
sufficiently large mutation set Θ˜i = {θ˜
1
i , . . . , θ˜
mi
i } with Ei = {ε
1
i , . . . , ε
mi
i } in every
i-th population such that the strategies of the mutants satisfy the relations∑
θ˜−i∈Θ˜−i
µ˜E−i(θ˜−i)pii
(
b˜(θ˜si , θ˜−i)
)
=
∑
θ˜−i∈Θ˜−i
µ˜E−i(θ˜−i)ui
for every i ∈ N and every θ˜si ∈ Θ˜i.
Since u ∈ SQco, we can choose suitable pure-strategy profiles a
1, . . . , ak ∈
∏
i∈N Ai
for some k ∈ Z+ with k ≤ n+ 1 such that
u =
r1
r
pi(a1) + · · ·+
rk
r
pi(ak)
where
∑k
j=1 rj = r and rj ∈ Z
+ for j = 1, . . . , k. 18 We define α1, . . . , αr ∈
∏
i∈N Ai
by specifying α1 = · · · = αr1 = a1, and
αr1+···+rj−1+1 = · · · = αr1+···+rj−1+rj = aj
for j = 2, . . . , k. In each i-th population, we introduce a mutation set Θ˜i =
{θ˜1i , . . . , θ˜
r
i } with ε
s
i = ε for all s ∈ {1, . . . , r}, and suppose that their strategies
satisfy the following: for any s1, . . . , sn ∈ {1, . . . , r},
b˜(θ˜s11 , . . . , θ˜
sn
n ) = α
κ(s1,...,sn)+1
18It can be true that k ≤ n+ 1 by Carathe´odory’s Theorem.
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where κ(s1, . . . , sn) is an integer between 0 and r − 1 satisfying s1 + · · · + sn ≡
κ(s1, . . . , s2) mod r. Then for every i ∈ N and every θ˜
s
i ∈ Θ˜i, we have the desired
property:∑
θ˜−i∈Θ˜−i
µ˜E−i(θ˜−i)pii
(
b˜(θ˜si , θ˜−i)
)
= εn−1rn−2
(
r1pii(a
1) + · · ·+ rkpii(a
k)
)
= rn−1εn−1ui =
∑
θ˜−i∈Θ˜−i
µ˜E−i(θ˜−i)ui.
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